

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 151182

FOR DALLEY AND HOLLOWAY FROM UNA

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CAPE TOWN, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS, LIBREVILLE, LONDON,  
LUSAKA, MAPUTO, OTTAWA & PRETORIA DTD 14 JUN 78

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 02427

PARIS PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, SF, WA

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: CONTACT GROUP'S COMMENTS ON  
THE ISSUES OF WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF  
THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE

THE CONTACT GROUP DRAFTED JUNE 13 THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS  
OF THE ISSUES OF WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE  
FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS PRIOR TO THEIR MEETING JUNE 14.  
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TEXT OF AGREED ANALYSIS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

IN HIS BRIEFING JUNE 12 OF THE WESTERN FIVE  
AMBASSADORS IN DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIAN PRESIDENT JULIUS  
NYERERE, ACTING AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE FRONTLINE, STATED  
THAT THE JUNE 10-11 SUMMIT HAD RESULTED IN FRONTLINE AND  
SWAPO AGREEMENT THAT ONLY TWO ISSUES REMAIN TO BE  
RESOLVED ON NAMIBIA: WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF THE

SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE. IN VIEW OF THE FRONTLINE'S OVERLY OPTIMISTIC REPORTING OF SWAPO'S VIEWS ON OCCASION IN THE PAST, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO VERIFY WITH SWAPO FIRST-HAND, PRIOR TO ANY MEETING OF THE FIVE WITH THEM, THAT SWAPO CONSIDERS THESE TO BE THE ONLY REMAINING ISSUES AND THAT THEY SUPPORT THE SOLUTIONS ENDORSED AT THE SUMMIT. INFORMATION FROM GABORONE SUGGESTS THAT SWAPO MAY ALSO CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE POWERS OF THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE FOLLOWING IS THE CONTACT GROUP'S ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES OF WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE.

1. WALVIS BAY

A. FRONTLINE STATES AND SWAPO: PRESIDENT NYERERE INFORMED THE FIVE THAT DURING THE SUMMIT THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO HAD AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A STATEMENT FROM THE FIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WALVIS BAY IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NAMIBIA. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE LUANDA COMMUNIQUE WHICH STATED:

"THE FRONTLINE STATES APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND PARTICULARLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
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COUNCIL TO REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA AND PARTICULARLY THAT WALVIS BAY IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NAMIBIA. THE FRONTLINE STATES CALL URGENTLY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA BY A RAPID RETURN OF WALVIS BAY TO NAMIBIA. MEANWHILE ANY ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF SOUTH AFRICA TO USE WALVIS BAY TO SABOTAGE THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA MUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

B. CURRENT WESTERN FIVE POSITION: PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT, THE FIVE DESCRIBED THEIR POSITION ON WALVIS BAY TO ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT KAUNDA AS FOLLOWS:

"WALVIS BAY IS THE ONE ASPECT OF THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION ON WHICH NEITHER SWAPO NOR SOUTH AFRICA IS WILLING TO BUDGE. BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH OF FEELING OF BOTH PARTIES ON THIS TOPIC, THE FIVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE MATTER OF WALVIS BAY COULD NOT BE RESOLVED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

"THE FIVE FEEL STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE COMPELLING GEOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, ETHNIC, AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARGUMENTS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF WALVIS BAY. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE INTEGRITY AND VIABILITY OF THE INDEPENDENT

STATE OF NAMIBIA CANNOT BE ASSURED WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF WALVIS BAY. THE FIVE WILL PRESS FOR THE OPENING WITHOUT DELAY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO REACHING EARLY AGREEMENT THAT NAMIBIA HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER WALVIS BAY, AND THE FIVE WILL LEND THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO THE ATTAINMENT OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIVE ARE, THEREFORE, PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES FIRMLY TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EITHER  
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THROUGH A DECLARATION OR THROUGH SUPPORT OF A RESOLUTION TO THE SAME EFFECT, IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AS A WHOLE."

C. COMMENTS: WE BELIEVE OUR POSITION IS NOT TOO FAR FROM THAT OF THE FRONTLINE STATES; HOWEVER, IT MAY PROVE DIFFICULT TO AGREE ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WILL PROBABLY INSIST ON DESCRIBING WALVIS BAY AS "AN INTEGRAL PART OF NAMIBIA". IT IS NOW TIME TO DISCUSS WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRONTLINE, THE PRECISE LANGUAGE OF A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON WALVIS BAY. THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH TANZANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SALIM IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S ROLE AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE FRONTLINE AND THE PROMINENT ROLE THAT SALIM WOULD BE LIKELY TO PLAY BEHIND THE SCENES. ONLY BY DOING THIS WILL WE BE ABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF LANGUAGE WILL PROVE TO BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. (THE FIVE AGREED MAY 24 ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION INCORPORATING THE SUBSTANCE OF B ABOVE, AND THIS COULD SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH SALIM.) TO THE EXTENT THAT THE FRONTLINE OR SWAPO INSIST ON A CATEGORIC STATEMENT THAT WALVIS BAY IS NOW AN INTEGRAL PART OF NAMIBIA, WE MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN LENDING OUR SUPPORT. WHATEVER THE LANGUAGE AGREED UPON, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IT NOT IMPINGE UPON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROPOSAL. THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO APPARENTLY INTEND THAT THE REQUIRED SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA RATHER THAN STIPULATE A POSITION WHICH WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION.

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BOTHA'S REACTION (JUNE 13) TO THE FRONTLINE STATES' POSITION WAS TO SAY THAT "WALVIS BAY BELONGS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EVEN CONSIDER THE SWAPO POSITION BEFORE

OR AFTER THE TRANSITION."

HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION ON WALVIS BAY WAS THAT IT MUST NOT BE BROUGHT INTO THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WITH NAMIBIA ON THE FUTURE OF WALVIS BAY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WE ENVISION WOULD, AS STATED ABOVE, BE SUPPORTED BY THE FIVE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCEPTANCE BY SWAPO OF THE WESTERN FIVE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AS A WHOLE. IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE SETTLEMENT BUT ONLY ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON WALVIS BAY. THUS THIS PROCEDURE WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION.

2. THE LOCATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE.

A. THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO. ACCORDING TO NYERERE, THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO AGREED AT THE SUMMIT THAT, BECAUSE OF THE CASSINGA RAID, THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE LOCATED AT "ONE OR TWO PLACES SOUTH OF WINDHOEK". NYERERE STATED THAT PRIOR TO CASSINGA THE FRONTLINE HAD BEEN TELLING SWAPO TO ACCEPT THE SITES DESIGNATED IN THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL; HOWEVER, IN THE WAKE OF THE RAID, ANGOLA, ZAMBIA, AS WELL AS SWAPO, COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. NYERERE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT A CHANGE IN LOCATION.

B. THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE FIVE. THE POSITION OF THE FIVE IS CONTAINED IN THE FIVE'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFIDENTIAL

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SETTLEMENT WHICH STATES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE WOULD BE LOCATED IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA AT "OSHIVELLO OR GROOTFONTEIN OR BOTH". BY ACCEPTING THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE ACCEPTED THESE LOCATIONS.

C. COMMENTS: A CHANGE IN THE LOCATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE WOULD NECESSITATE A CHANGE IN OUR PROPOSAL AND THEREFORE WOULD RISK PROVIDING SOUTH AFRICA WITH AN EXCUSE FOR WITHDRAWING ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL OR FOR REOPENING OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL. GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS WITHIN WHICH SOUTH AFRICA'S RESIDUAL FORCE MUST OPERATE, IT SHOULD NOT BE IMPORTANT WHERE THE BASE IS LOCATED SO LONG AS IT IS AWAY FROM POPULATED AREAS. NEVERTHELESS BOTH SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA HAVE ZEROED IN ON THE LOCATION, OSTENSIBLY FOR "SECURITY REASONS". WHILE THE LOCATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AT GROOTFONTEIN IS AN EMOTIONAL

ISSUE FOR THE AFRICANS, IT ALSO IS AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE FOR SOUTH AFRICA. MOVING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM GROOTFONTEIN WOULD NOT ONLY REDUCE THE FACE-SAVING NATURE OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE CONCEPT, IT WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S ULTIMATE HOPE TO RETAIN A BASE AT GROOTFONTEIN EVEN AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW UNITED THE FRONTLINE ARE ON THE NEED TO ALTER THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE. (WHEN THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TANZANIA ASKED NYERERE WHETHER SUCH A CHANGE WAS NECESSARY, NYERERE RESPONDED, "PLEASE TRY.") IN FACT THE FRONTLINE COMMUNIQUE MENTIONS NOTHING OF THE NEED TO ALTER THE LOCATION OF THE FORCE. INSTEAD IT STATES THAT RESIDUAL SOUTH  
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AFRICAN FORCES IN NAMIBIA "SHOULD BE PLACED IN CONDITIONS WHICH PREVENT THEM FROM BEING USED AS A MEANS OF INTIMIDATION AND REPRESSION AGAINST THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE AND FOR AGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBORING STATES."

THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE FIVE REGARDING THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE:

(1) REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE. THIS WOULD REPRESENT A WILLINGNESS TO ALTER OUR PROPOSAL -- SOMETHING WHICH THE FIVE HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNWILLING TO DO.

(2) WORK WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE PROPOSAL TO DETERMINE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES WHICH COULD BE GIVEN TO THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO. SUCH ASSURANCES MIGHT INCLUDE ONE OR A COMBINATION OF THE FOLLOWING:

(A) LOCATE THE RESIDUAL FORCE AT GROOTFONTEIN ALONE. (THIS COULD BE DONE BY OBTAINING SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD OPT FOR THIS LONE LOCATION. IT WOULD NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE IN THE PROPOSAL SINCE THE PROPOSAL LEAVES THE CHOICE OF "OSHIVELLO OR GROOTFONTEIN OR BOTH" UP TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. OF THE TWO LOCATIONS GROOTFONTEIN IS THE FARTHER SOUTH AND IS OUTSIDE OF OVAMBOLAND.)

(B) PROVIDE SPECIFIC ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL STRICTLY LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS RETAINED BY THE RESIDUAL FORCE TO THAT APPROPRIATE FOR A FORCE OF 1500.

(C) PROVIDE SPECIFIC ASSURANCE THAT FLIGHTS OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO AND FROM THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORED AND ONLY MADE

AFTER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN INFORMED IN  
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A TIMELY MANNER.

(D) SEEK AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
FOR A LARGER UN MILITARY PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA THAN  
PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED -- THUS ALLOWING INFORMAL  
ASSURANCES TO THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO THAT THE UN FORCE  
HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ENLARGED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE  
REASSURANCE.

3. PROVIDE THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO WITH SOME  
INDICATION OF WHAT THE FIVE WOULD DO IF SOUTH AFRICA  
WERE TO TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE  
MAINTENANCE OF A RESIDUAL FORCE IN NAMIBIA. THIS NO  
DOUBT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE FIVE TO DO, AS NO ONE  
WILL BE ANXIOUS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES PUBLICLY TO A  
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION. YOUNG UNQUOTE  
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